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Abstract
A new model is presented which produces credit spreads that do
not converge to zero for short maturities. Our set-up includes incom-
plete, i.e., delayed and asymmetric information. When the financial
market observes the company’s earnings with a delay, the effect on
both default policy and credit spreads is negligible, compared to the
Leland (1994) model. When information is asymmetrically distributed
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between the management of the company and the financial market,
short credit spreads do not converge to zero. This is result is similar
to the Duffie and Lando (2001) model, although our simpler model
improves some limitations in their set-up.. Short interest rates from
our model are used to illustrate effects similar to the dry-up in the
interbank market experienced after the summer of 2007.
Keywords and phrases: Credit risk, credit spreads, delayed informa-
tion, asymmetric information.
JEL-classification: G12, G33
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We analyze the effects of delayed and asymmetric information on credit
spreads and bankruptcy policy. In the case of delayed information the com-
pany’s earnings process is revealed to the agents in the economy with a time
delay. This time delay reflects the fact that it takes time for the manage-
ment of a company to gather, structure, analyze, and report information.
Disregarding all potential agency problems we assume that the manage-
ment always acts on the best behalf of the equity holders. Furthermore,
management has access to information no later, but possibly earlier than
the participants in the financial market. In the special case where the two
groups have access to the same information at the same time, we show that
a time delay has a minor effect on credit spreads for realistic parameter
values. On the other hand, any information asymmetry between the man-
agement and the financial market turns out to be of crucial importance
for the credit spreads. Delayed and asymmetric information have a small
impact on bankruptcy policy.
The risk that a debtor will not honor his contractual obligations with
the creditor is called credit risk. This topic has received attention in both
the academic literature and among practitioners. There are two dominat-
ing approaches to credit risk in the finance literature; structural models and
reduced form models. The first was pioneered by Merton (1974) and essen-
tially consists of modeling the value of a company’s assets by a stochastic
process. Debt and equity are then considered as contingent claims on the
total asset value. Some of the papers in this tradition include Black and
Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland (1994),
and Duffie and Lando (2001). The second approach assumes the existence
of a default arrival intensity. This approach was pioneered by Jarrow and
Turnbull (1992), for extensions see e.g., Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow,
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Lando, and Turnbull (1997), and Scho¨nbucher (1998).1
In traditional structural models, as a bond’s time to maturity approaches
zero, the credit spread approaches zero. This property is not in line with
observations in financial markets and is considered a problem with the struc-
tural models. The reduced form approach is typically able to produce strictly
positive credit spreads also for short term maturities, but is not founded on
economic models of the company. However, they seem to be more useful
than structural models when it comes to practical use and calibration to
market data.
Our paper is related to Duffie and Lando (2001) who present the first
example of a model where, in the presence of incomplete accounting infor-
mation, there is equivalence between the structural and the reduced form
approach. In their model there is an information asymmetry between equity
and bond holders. In particular, equity holders have access to more infor-
mation than the bond holders. To keep these two groups of financial agents
separated, equity is by assumption not traded, eliminating bond holders’ ac-
cess to the equity market. Equity holders are by assumption precluded from
buying corporate debt. The latter assumption is justified by insider-trading
regulation.
In our model the financial market participants, i.e., both equity and bond
holders, have access to the same information at any point in time. We do
not need to restrict each of these groups’ access to investments in the other
asset class. This is a reasonable and tractable property of our model and
corresponds nicely with what is observed in real markets. We claim that
this assumption is superior to Duffie and Lando’s for the following reasons:
1. Tradability of equity extends the model’s applicability to a much wider
set of companies. There are relatively few companies with a secondary
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market for corporate debt whose equity is not traded.2
2. When the company needs more capital to run its operations, non-
tradability of equity can cause equity holders to file for bankruptcy
due to liquidity problems, not because it is economically optimal. The
reasons are:
• The equity holders cannot finance infusion of capital by selling
or diluting their stocks.
• Equity holders might have problems borrowing money to finance
any infusion of capital by using the equity as collateral since the
true value of equity is only known by themselves and not by the
lender. Moreover, this information can not be revealed to the
lender.
3. We show that asymmetric information leads to wider credit spreads,
and thereby a higher cost of debt financing. This result implies a lower
debt ratio than the optimal ratio in the case of fully informed bond
holders. This again leads to a lower total value of the firm, and, thus,
asymmetric information also reduces the value of the equity. There
is therefore no economic rationale for keeping information away from
bond holders in these types of models.
The classical structural models use the value of the company as the state
variable. In real life the value of a company is typically not observable.
According to Jarrow and Protter (2004) the implications of this are not
well understood. Our model increases the understanding of this problem
because all decisions are endogenously modeled and take the lack of complete
information into account.
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In the first version of our model the information is distributed to the
financial market from the management without delay. The true value of the
earnings process is assumed to be observed with a time delay m by all agents.
In this case the time of bankruptcy, seen from the bond holders perspective,
is not totally inaccessible3, but the payoff received in case of bankruptcy is
random. This is also the case for the equity holders, and they can in some
cases “wrongly” choose to file for bankruptcy in the sense that the value of
the company may more than cover the debt holders’ claim and bankruptcy
costs. We label this possibility the bankruptcy lottery. This situation has
sometimes been observed in practice4.
In the second version of our model the management of the company has
a shorter delay of information than the financial market, i.e., m ≤ l, where
l represents the time lag of information to the financial market. In this case
the time of bankruptcy is totally inaccessible for the bond holders (and the
equity holders), and this information asymmetry makes the model equivalent
to an intensity based model and the model produces strictly positive credit
spreads as the time to maturity vanishes.
The paper is organized as follows: In section I we present the economic
model and set-up. The classical case with full information is reviewed in
section II. The case with delayed information is analyzed in section III, while
the case with delayed and asymmetric information is analyzed in section IV.
In section V we show that our model produces short-term credit spreads that
can possibly explain the recent dry-up in the interbank market. Section VI
contains some concluding remarks. Technical results and proofs are collected
in 5 appendices.
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I The Economic Model
We use the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) version of the economic
model of Leland (1994), see e.g., Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). The
EBIT process of the company is given by the stochastic differential equation
dδt = µδtdt+ σδtdBt, (1)
where the drift and volatility parameters µ and σ are constants. We assume
that µ ≤ r, where r represents the constant risk free interest rate and
that the initial value of the process δ0 is a positive constant. Here Bt is
a standard Brownian motion that is defined on a fixed, filtered probability
space (Ω,F , P ). Furthermore, P represents the original probability measure,
and all agents are risk neutral.
The information filtration Ft is generated by the process {δs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t}
(augmented with all sets of measure zero). To incorporate delayed infor-
mation into our model we assume that the management’s and the financial
market’s information is given by the filtrations Fmt and F lt , respectively,
where
Fmt = Ft−m, for all t ≥ m,
F lt = Ft−l, for all t ≥ l,
and 0 ≤ m ≤ l. Clearly, from this specification
F lt ⊆ Fmt ⊆ Ft.
The time lags are illustrated in Figure 1. In addition to the information
contained in F lt , the financial market also observes whether the company is
bankrupt or not.
Let the assessment of the value of the company at time t by an agent
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with information delay k ∈ {0,m, l} be denoted by V kt . Thus
V kt = E
[ ∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)δs−kds
∣∣∣Fkt ] = δt−kr − µ, (2)
where t ≥ k. We remark that V kt is simply δt−k multiplied by a constant,
and is therefore also a geometric Brownian motion.
As k → 0 the value converges to the value where there is no delay in the
flow of information. Expression (2) clearly reflects the delayed information
through the presence of δt−k instead of δt that is present under complete
information. Note that V kt = V
0
t−k, i.e., the value assessed at time t by an
agent with information lag k is identical to the value assessed at time t− k
by an agent with complete information. In particular the market’s assessed
asset value, V lt is based on the filtration F lt .
As in Leland (1994) we assume that the company has issued perpetual
debt with face value D. The debt is serviced by a constant rate of coupon
payments C. These payments are tax deductible (only interest is paid on
perpetual debt). The tax benefit rate is θC, where θ is the tax rate.
The equity holders decide when to default. In our model they delegate
the daily operations of the company to the management. We completely
disregard all potential agency problems between the management and the
equity holders and assume that the management acts in the best interest of
the owners. However, we assume in the second version of our model that
management is better informed than the equity holders, and we consider a
potential bankruptcy as such a severe event that the management immedi-
ately informs the owners if filing for bankruptcy is optimal. Even though
the equity holders formally decide when to default, such a decision is based
on the information of the management in our model.
We define the stopping time τ with respect to the filtration Fmt for fixed
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t ≥ m as
τ = inf{u ≥ t : V mu ≤ V mB }, (3)
where from expression (2) V mt =
δt−m
r−µ and V
m
B is a given constant. In this
model the company is bankrupt and liquidated the first time V mt = V
m
B , i.e.,
τ represents the time of bankruptcy. We denote the complete-information-
value of the company upon bankruptcy by Vτ , i.e., from equation (2),
Vτ ≡ V 0τ =
δτ
r − µ.
Upon bankruptcy a cost of αVτ occurs. Here α is assumed constant, and the
bankruptcy cost is therefore proportional to the complete-information-value.
Also, in case of bankruptcy, the debt holders require the face value of the
debt D to be repaid. In general Vτ is different from V mτ , i.e., the complete-
information value of the assets at time τ is different from the value upon
which the bankruptcy decision is made. In particular, there is a positive
probability that Vτ − D − αVτ > 0. In this case the time τ value of the
company is sufficient to cover debt and bankruptcy costs, and any proceeds
are paid to the equity holders.
II The Classical Case with Complete Information
Let us start by looking at the classical case where there is no delay in the
flow of information. In this case l = m = 0, F lt = Fmt = Ft, and V mB = VB,
where VB = V 0B. In this section we denote the initial time by t, where t ≥ 0.
II.1 Equity Holders’ Optimization Problem
The equity holders are faced with the following optimal stopping problem
(see e.g., Duffie (2001), chapter 11.C)
φ(v) = sup
τ∈T
E
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(δs − (1− θ)C)ds
∣∣∣Ft], (4)
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where T is the set of Ft-adapted stopping times. The value function satisfies
the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
µvφv +
1
2
σ2v2φvv − rφ+ (r − µ)v − (1− θ)C = 0, (5)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The general solution to this
equation is
φ(v) = A1vγ1 +A2vγ2 + v − (1− θ)C
r
,
where Ai, i = 1, 2, are constants to be determined from boundary conditions
and
γi =
1
2σ
2 − µ±
√
(µ− 12σ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
,
with γ1 < 0 and γ2 ≥ 1. Differentiating φ with resepct to v yields
φ′(v) = γ1A1vγ1−1 + γ2A2vγ2−1 + 1.
When the value of the company approaches infinity, only equity holders
benefit from any further increase in asset value, thus
lim
v→∞φ
′(v) = 1.
As γ2 ≥ 1, this condition implies that A2 = 0, i.e.,
φ(v) = A1vγ1 + v − (1− θ)C
r
. (6)
The value matching and the high contact conditions require that
φ(VB) = 0 (7)
and
φv(VB) = 0, (8)
respectively. Equations (7) and (8) can be solved for A1 and VB. The
solution for VB is5
VB =
γ1
γ1 − 1
(1− θ)C
r
. (9)
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II.2 Corporate Bond Pricing
As Duffie and Lando (2001) we analyze a zero coupon bond maturing at time
s with recovery rate R(τ, s) in the case of default at time τ . Our original
model is based on one perpetual bond. Duffie and Lando (2001) explain the
connection between the original model and the following unit discount bond
by e.g., assuming that the perpetual debt is stripped into a continuum of
zero-coupon bonds maturing at time s, s ∈ (t,∞). The time t bond price,
for each dollar of principal, is given by
ϕ(t, s) = e−r(s−t)P (s) +
∫ s
t
R(τ, u)e−r(u−t)fτ (u)du, (10)
where P (s) = P (τ > s
∣∣∣Ft) is given in expression (23) in appendix A. Here
fτ (u) is the probability density of the stopping time τ .
In the special case considered in Duffie and Lando (2001), whereR(u, s) =
(1− α)e−r(s−u), u ∈ (t, s], the pricing expression (10) simplifies to
ϕ(t, s) = e−r(s−t)P (s) + (1− α)e−r(s−t)(1− P (s)). (11)
We use this recovery rate throughout the paper because it leads to tractable
analytical expressions. Other, possibly more realistic recovery functions
have much of the same qualitative properties as the one above, but they
may require numerical solutions.
Example 1. Assume that δt = 3.5, r = 0.08, and µ = 0.045. From expres-
sion (2) these parameters give Vt = 100. Furthermore, assume that σ = 0.3,
θ = 0.3, α = 0.3, and C = 13. From expression (9) VB = 65. With the
recovery policy in expression (11) the credit spreads for zero-coupon bonds
with maturities of up to three years are plotted in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 should be placed about here.]
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From Figure 2 we clearly see that the credit spread approaches zero as
the time to maturity approaches zero, a typical property of structural models
of credit risk.
II.3 Credit Default Swap (CDS)
CDSs are the most common form of credit derivatives. A CDS is a default
insurance contract. For each unit of face value of debt it pays the amount
X = 1− (1− α)VB
D
,
at the time of default, if default happens before the CDS matures at some
time T . The cost of the insurance is covered by coupon payments to the
issuer of the CDS, known as the CDS spread. The CDS spread is the annu-
alized coupon rate c(t, T ) that implies a total market value of the swap of
zero at the time of issue. Assuming semi-annually coupons and that n = 2T ,
c(t, T ) =
2XE[e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}
∣∣∣Ft]∑n
i=1 e
−0.5riE[1{τ > t+ 0.5i}
∣∣∣Ft]
=
2XΥ(T − t, Vt, VB)∑n
i=1 e
−0.5riP (t+ 0.5i)
,
where Υ(T − t, Vt, VB) and P (t+0.5i) are given in the appendices in expres-
sions (25) and (23), respectively.
We present a numerical example illustrating the CDS spreads in section
IV.3 where we also include delayed and asymmetric information.
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III The Case with Delayed Information
III.1 The Equity Holders’ Optimization Problem
In the case with delayed information equity holders, debt holders, and man-
agement have access to the same information, but they receive the infor-
mation with a time lag, i.e., l = m > 0. Also in this section the initial
point in time is denoted by t ≥ l. Thus, at time t agents observe the state
variable (i.e., the EBIT process) at time t−m. This assumption changes the
optimization problem for the equity holders. From standard properties of
geometric Brownian motions follow that the complete-information-value of
the assets at the bankruptcy time τ is given by the lognormally distributed
random variable
Vτ = V mτ e
(µ− 1
2
σ2)m+σ(Bτ−Bτ−m). (12)
From the definition of the barrier V mB in expression (3), the time τ value of
the assets in expression (12) can also be written as
Vτ = V mB e
(µ− 1
2
σ2)m+σ(Bτ−Bτ−m).
In the case where the value of the assets is sufficiently high to cover both
repayment of the debt and bankruptcy costs, i.e., Vτ − D − αVτ > 0, the
equity holders get the payoff Vτ−D−αVτ . By deciding to file for bankruptcy
at time τ , the equity holders enter a bankruptcy lottery6 with payoff ((1−
α)Vτ −D)+. The time τ value of this lottery is
pi(V mB ) = E[((1− α)Vτ −D)+
∣∣∣Fmτ ]
= (1− α)eµmV mB N(z)−DN(z − σ
√
m),
(13)
where
z =
ln
(
(1−α)VmB
D
)
+ (µ+ 12σ
2)m
σ
√
m
and N(·) is the cumulative normal probability distribution function.
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Proof. The result follows from the standard Black-Scholes-Merton formula
for a European call option, but without discounting since the payoff is re-
ceived instantaneously when V mτ = V
m
B .
The equity holders’ optimization problem is now given by
φ(v) = sup
τ∈Tm
E
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(δs−m−(1−θ)C)ds+e−r(τ−t)pi(V mB )
∣∣∣Fmt ], (14)
where Tm denotes the set of Fmt -adapted stopping times. There are three
differences between expressions (14) and (4). The first is that the bankruptcy
lottery enters the optimization problem. Second, the state variable δ enters
with a lagged value, and third, the information set at time t is lagged.
In appendix C we show that the equity holders’ optimization problem
is equivalent to a standard stopping problem. Thus, also in the case with
delayed information the value function φ(v) is the solution to the ODE
(5) and has general solution given by expression (6). However, the value
matching and the high contact conditions now change to
φ(V mB ) = pi(V
m
B ) (15)
and
φv(V mB ) = piv(V
m
B ) = (1− α)eµmN(z), (16)
respectively.
Using expressions (15) and (16), we are not able to find analytical ex-
pressions for A1 and V mB . However, equations (15) and (16) can easily be
solved numerically.
In Table I we illustrate the effect of different delays on the default barrier
and the value of the bankruptcy lottery. The effect is relatively small for
delays less than one year. For instance, when m = 0.5, the value of V mB is
only changed at the second decimal place and the value of the bankruptcy
14
lottery is zero with two digits accuracy. For longer delays, the value of the
bankruptcy lottery is larger and, thus, more important for the equity holders’
bankruptcy decision. The value function φ is increasing in the assessed value
of the assets (V mt ). Combining this observation with expression (15), it is
clear that the assessed value V mt that makes (15) hold (i.e., V
m
B ) must be
higher for higher values on the righthand side. Thus, longer delays increase
the default barrier.
From Table II it is clear that increasing the volatility has virtually no
effect on the value of the bankruptcy lottery, except for extremely high
values of the volatility. Note that we have taken into account that a more
risky firm typically has less debt than a less risky firm.
III.2 Corporate Bond Pricing
The bond holders still price corporate bonds according to expressions (10)
and (11). The only way in which delayed information can change the credit
spreads, compared to the classical case, is if the default barrier V mB 6= VB. As
we saw in Table I, this can happen for large delays in the flow of information
and/or very high asset volatilities, c.f. Table II. In Table III we report
credit spreads for different delays in information and different levels of the
volatility. The corresponding default barriers are taken from Tables I and
II. As Table III shows, for reasonable delays (typically less than one year)
and levels of the volatility, any changes in the credit spreads are negligible.
The above observations may shed light on two important aspects:
1. The effect of not being able to observe the process for the value of
the assets in a structural model has a minor effect on the optimal
default policy, c.f., the discussion in Jarrow and Protter (2004). This
effect becomes noticeable for larger delays and extremely high levels
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of volatility.
2. Delayed information has a negligible effect on credit spreads.
[Tables I, II, and III should be placed about here.]
IV The Case with Asymmetric Information
We now analyze the case with asymmetric and delayed information. Here
0 ≤ m < l. As before, the initial point in time t ≥ l. The asymmetry occurs
because there is a difference in the information delay between the financial
market and the management.
In a financial market where both stocks and corporate bonds are traded,
both equity and bond holders typically have the same information. If this is
not the case, and information is considered valuable, bond holders can buy
one share of stock each if equity holders have more information. Similarly,
if bond holders have more information than the equity holders, the equity
holders can each buy one share of bond. Both strategies eliminate any
information asymmetry.
Both equity and bond holders observe the value of the assets with a delay
l. The management of the company observes the value of the company with a
delay m ≤ l. As argued in the introduction, and as we show appendix D and
futher illustrate in Example 2, there are no reasons for keeping information
away from the capital market in these kinds of models. The difference in
time lag, l −m, therefore reflects the time it takes to inform the financial
market. Reporting information right away may be costly. In practice, there
can be strategic reasons (outside of our model) for management to keep
information away from the financial market for some time. Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) find that since 1937 only four companies
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have defaulted on bonds with an investment grade rating from Moody’s.
This suggests that the time lag m− l cannot be too long. With a sufficiently
large time lag, even a company issuing bonds rated investment grade may
have enough time to move into default.7
IV.1 The Equity Holders’ Optimization Problem
The management of the company are now better informed than the equity
holders. Because they act in the best interest of the owners, they will now
solve the equity holders’ optimization problem as if the owners had the
same information as the management, i.e.,
φ(v) = sup
τ∈Tm
E
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(δs−m − (1− θ)C)ds+ e−r(τ−t)pi(V mB )
∣∣∣Fmt ].(17)
This problem is identical to the problem in expression (14), and thus have
the same solution. In many countries it is illegal for the management to run
the company on the debt holders’ expense if they know that the company
should have been declared bankrupt, partially justifying this assumption.
Financial distress and bankruptcy are characteristics of a highly extraor-
dinary situation for a company. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
such an event leads to an increased speed in the flow of information between
the management and the equity holders.8 In our model when the manage-
ment observes that the value hits the (optimal) default barrier, the equity
holders are informed and immediately file for bankruptcy, c.f., equation (17).
IV.2 Corporate Bond Pricing
In section II (section III) the bond holders observe that the value of the
assets (lagged asset value) approaches and eventually hits the default barrier
VB (V mB ). In contrast to this situation, under asymmetric information they
may observe that the assessed asset value V lt approaches V
m
B , but they never
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observe that it hits V mB because the bankruptcy decision is based on the value
V mt with l > m. Formally, the stopping time τ is totally inaccessible, as also
is the case in the model of Duffie and Lando (2001). Thus, also our model
is an example of a structural model that is equivalent to an intensity based
model.
For the bond holders to calculate the bond prices, they still need to
estimate the default probability. To this end, let Pm(s) = P (τ > s|V mt >
V mB ;V
l
t ). Here {τ > s} represents the event ‘no default before time s’
observed by the management. Thus Pm(s) is the probability for no default
before time s observed by the management, conditional on the information
available for the bond holders. The bond holders’ information set contains
two relevant pieces of information:
1. the lagged asset value observed by the management is greater than the
default barrier V mB (otherwise the company would have been declared
bankrupt), and
2. the assessed asset value V lt .
Using Baye’s rule, we have that
Pm(s) =
P (τ > s|V lt ) · P (V mt > V mB |τ > s;V lt )
P (V mt > V mB |V lt )
=
P (τ > s|V lt )
P (V mt > V mB |V lt )
.
From expression (22) in appendix A, we can write this as
Pm(s) =
Ψ(s− t+ l −m,V lt , V mB )
N
(− ln y+ν(l−m)
σ
√
l−m
) , (18)
where y = V mB /V
l
t and ν = µ− 12σ2.
Assuming the same recovery rates as in subsection II.2 and replacing
P (s) by Pm(s), the time t value of a zero-coupon bond maturing at time s
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is similar to expression (11) and is given by
ϕm(t, s) = e−r(s−t)Pm(s) + (1− α)e−r(s−t)(1− Pm(s)). (19)
Based on the definition of the credit spread ηm and expression (19) we have
that
e−(r+η
m)(s−t) = e−r(s−t)Pm(s) + (1− α)e−r(s−t)(1− Pm(s)),
so
ηm =
− ln
(
αPm(s) + (1− α)
)
s− t . (20)
First we notice that the credit spread vanishes as α → 0. If there is no
economic loss in case of bankruptcy, there is of course no credit risk. In ap-
pendix D we show that the spread under asymmetric information is greater
than the spread under symmetrically distributed information.
Taking the limit as s→ t, we have that
lim
s→tP
m(s) = 1− y2νσ−2
N
(
ln y+ν(l−m)
σ
√
l−m
)
N
(− ln y+ν(t−m)
σ
√
t−m
) . (21)
The limit in (21) is strictly positive and less than 1, thus it must be the case
that
lim
s→t η =∞.
The intuition for this result is that if the defaultable zero-coupon bond has a
price less than the default-free zero-coupon bond when the time to maturity
vanishes, this can only be achieved for a “very” high credit spread (i.e., an
infinite credit spread).
Example 2. Assume that δt = 3.5, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.045, r = 0.08, C = 13,
θ = 0.3, α = 0.3, m = 0.1, and l = 0.25. These parameter values give
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V mB = 65. With the recovery policy in expression (11) the credit spreads
for zero-coupon bonds with maturities of up to three years are plotted in
Figure 3. For comparison, also the credit spreads from Example 1 are plotted,
demonstrating that asymmetric information leads to higher credit spreads.
[Figure 3 should be placed about here]
In contrast to the credit spreads under complete information, the spreads
under asymmetric information in the short end of Figure 3 do not approach
zero. The credit spread under asymmetric information to the far left (2.4%)
is for a bond maturing in half a day. In practice soon to mature corporate
bonds are not analyzed in terms of their credit spread because “the discount”
mostly reflects the probability for immediately bankruptcy, adjusted for the
recovery rate (see e.g., the discussion on page 14-15 in Lando (2004)). Al-
though not commented by the authors, in similar figures in Duffie and Lando
(2001) it seems like the x-axes are truncated, possibly to exclude such “high”
short-term credit spreads. However, as we argue in section V, this property
of the model can be used for explaining high short-term interest rates as,
e.g., recently observed in the interbank market.
IV.3 Credit Default Swap
In the case of delayed and asymmetric information the coupon rate is given
by
c(t, T ) =
2XE[e−r(τ−t)]1{τ ≤ T}
∣∣∣V mt > VB;V lt ]∑n
i=1 e
−0.5riE[1{τ > t+ 0.5i}
∣∣∣V mt > VB;V lt ]
=
2XΓ(T − t, V mt , V mB )∑n
i=1 e
−0.5riPm(t+ 0.5i)
,
where Γ(T − t, V mt , V mB ) is given in expression (29) in appendix E and Pm(·)
is defined in expression (18). Note that X now depends on V mB (instead of
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VB).
Example 3. Assume that δt = 3.5, σ = 0.3, µ = 0.045, r = 0.08, C = 13,
θ = 0.3, α = 0.3, m = 0.1, l = 0.25, and the coupon payments on the CDS
are paid semiannually. These parameter values give V mB = 65. For these
parameters, the CDS rates for the classical case and the case with delayed
and asymmetric information are plotted in Figure 4. The hightes rates are
for the case with delayed and asymmetric information.
[Figure 4 should be placed about here]
V Implications for Credit Spreads in the Inter-
bank Market
In this section we demonstrate how our model can help explain the effect
the sub-prime crises had on credit spreads in the interbank market, i.e.,
the market for over-night borrowing and lending between banks. As the
sub-prime crises started to evolve during the summer of 2007, the inter-
bank market dried-out. Banks ceased to lend money to each other and
central banks supplied short-term liquidity. The dry-up of liquidity in this
typically high-liquid market, was caused by concerns about in which finan-
cial state different banks were. Any bank had sound concerns about other
banks exposure to the sub-prime market. This was (and still is) a situation
where information about the quality of a given bank’s balance sheet (and
thereby also its earnings potential) is definitively asymmetrically distributed
between this particular bank and other banks. Our model shows that short-
term credit spreads can be highly sensitive to asset volatility and assessed
asset values. In Figure 5 we show how, cetreris paribus, the overnight inter-
est rate changes with the volatility of the assets. Similarly, Figure 6 shows
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how, cetreris paribus, the spread varies for different levels of the assessed
asset value V lt . Thus, if the asset value assessed by other banks drop be-
cause of exposure to the sub-prime market, the overnight borrowing rate
for this bank can increase quite dramatically. Therefore, the combination
of increased risk (i.e., higher volatility) and lower assessed asset values due
to exposure to the sub-prime market, could easily lead to very high credit
spreads. This description corresponds to recent market observations, and it
also fits well into our simple model with asymmetric information.
[Figures 5 and 6 should be placed about here.]
VI Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effect of asymmetric and delayed information on
credit spreads on corporate bonds traded in a secondary market and on
CDS spreads. In the case where the bankruptcy decision is based on delayed
information we identified a potential gain for equity holders as a lottery
with non-negative payoff. This payoff may be strictly positive in the case
the actual market value of the company is significantly higher than the
value of the company on which the bankruptcy decision was based. For
realistic parameter values, and as long as all market participants, including
the management of the company, have the same amount of information, this
lottery has a rather small value, and the effect on bankruptcy policy and
credit spreads is also small.
Asymmetric information, on the other hand, has a substantial effect
on credit spreads. Asymmetric information explains why credit spreads on
bonds with short time to maturity do not approach zero. Our results are
qualitatively similar to the results of Duffie and Lando (2001), which they de-
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rive in a model with incomplete accounting information. Our model relaxes
some of their assumptions, e.g., regarding tradability of stocks and bonds,
although it does not contain noisy information, only delayed information.
Our analysis shows that it is not the incomplete accounting information
per se that causes the equivalence between the structural and reduced form
approaches, but rather the information asymmetry between the equity and
the bond holders.
As an additional application of our model we illustrate how the over-
night interest rate can become very high when assessed asset values fall
and/or asset volatility increases. The results from our model are consistent
with the dry-up in the interbank market in the wake of the sub-prime crises.
A Survival Probability
Consider a geometric Brownian motion with dynamics as in expression (1)
and initial value v. The probability of not crossing the barrier vb in a time
period of length s when v > vb, is
Ψ(s, v, vb) = N
(− ln vbv + νs
σ
√
s
)
− (vb
v
)2νσ
−2
N
( ln vbv + νs
σ
√
s
)
, (22)
where ν = µ− 12σ2, see e.g., Musiela and Rutkowski (1997) Corollary B.3.4.
We define
P (s) = Ψ(s− t, Vt, VB). (23)
B Definition of Υ
For s > t, let
Υ(s− t, v, vb) = E[e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ s− t}
∣∣∣Ft]. (24)
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Then
Υ(s− t, v, vb) = eb(z−w)N(b− w(s− t)√
s− t ) + e
b(z+w)N(
b+ w(s− t)√
s− t ), (25)
where
b = ln(vb/v)/σ,
z = (µ− 1
2
σ2)/σ,
and
w =
√
z2 + 2r,
see e.g., Lando (2004), appendix B.
C The Equity Holders’ Optimization Problem in
the Case with Delayed Information
Observe that
sup
τ∈Tm
E
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)(δs−m − (1− θ)C)ds+ e−r(τ−t)pi(V mB )
∣∣∣Fmt ]
= sup
τ∗∈T ∗
E
[ ∫ τ∗
t−m
e−r(s−(t−m))(δs − (1− θ)C)ds
+e−r(τ
∗−(t−m))pi(V mB )
∣∣∣Ft−m],
where τ∗ = τ − m and T ∗ is the set of all Ft−m-adapted stopping times.
The expression in the last line we recognize as a standard optimal stopping
problem and its connection to ODEs is known. For details, see Øksendal
(2004).
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D Proof that Asymmetric Information Increases
Credit Spreads
In this appendix we show that, ceteris paribus, asymmetric information leads
to higher credit spreads. Let η be the credit spread under symmetrically
distributed information. We then have that
ηm > η
⇔
ϕm(t, s) < ϕ(t, s)
⇔
Pm(s) < P (s). (26)
Let A be the event that no bankruptcy takes place on the time interval
[t, s] and B the event that no bankruptcy takes place on the time interval
[t− (l −m), t]. We then have that (conditional on Vt = v)
P (s) = P (A|B). (27)
Let further Bˆ be the event that V mt > V mB . We then have that (conditional
on V lt = v
9)
Pm(s) =
P (A ∩ B)
P (Bˆ) . (28)
Combining equations (27) and (28) with the inequality in (26), we have that
P (A ∩ B)
P (Bˆ) < P (A|B).
Using Baye’s rule, we get that
P (A|B)P (B) < P (A|B)P (Bˆ)
⇔
P (B) < P (Bˆ).
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The last inequality is trivially satisfied, proving that credit spreads are
higher under asymmetric information than under symmetrically distributed
information.
E Credit Default Swap
In this appendix we derive the expression for Γ(T − t, V mt , V mB ).
Γ(T − t, V mt , V mB ) = E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}
∣∣∣V mt > V mB ;V lt ].
Trivially,
E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}
∣∣∣V lt ]
= E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}1{V mt > V mB }
∣∣∣V lt ]
+E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}1{V mt ≤ V mB }
∣∣∣V lt ].
Observe that
E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}1{V mt ≤ V mB }
∣∣∣V lt ]
= E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{V mt ≤ V mB }
∣∣∣V lt ]
= E
[
1{V mt ≤ V mB }
∣∣∣V lt ]
= P (V mt ≤ V mB
∣∣∣V lt ).
The second equality follows from the definition of the stopping time τ in
(3).
From Baye’s formula follows that
Γ(T − t, V mt , V mB ) =
E
[
e−r(τ−t)1{τ ≤ T}
∣∣∣V lt ]− P (V mt ≤ V mB ∣∣∣V lt )
P (V mt > V mB
∣∣∣V lt )
=
Υ(s− t+ l −m,V mt , V mB )− P (V mt ≤ V mB
∣∣∣V lt )
P (V mt > V mB
∣∣∣V lt ) .(29)
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Notes
1Comprehensive treatments of these two approaches can be found in the
enclopedic monograph by Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002) or in the more
accessible monograph by Duffie and Singleton (2003).
2Examples are Special Purpose Vehicles, mutually owned companies (banks
and insurers), foundations, and municipals.
3For a stopping time to have an associated intensity, it must be totally
inaccessible (in addition to technical requirements). Informally, a stopping
time τ is totally inaccessible if any increasing sequence of stopping times
converging to τ has probability zero.
4For instance when the Norwegian newspaper Oslo Posten was declared
bankrupt.
5In the special case considered by Leland (1994) where µ = r, VB =
(1− θ)C/(r + 0.5σ2).
6This lottery has some resemblance to the wild card play that is present
when trading in the CBOT Treasury bond futures, see e.g., Hull (2006).
7This observation also gives some justification for using a diffusion model
instead of a jump-diffusion model. Few companies “jump” into default when
their bonds are rated investment grade.
8The assumption that the equity holders are immediately informed can
be relaxed without adding much economic insight, but it will increase the
notational burden. It is enough that they are informed before time τ+(l−m),
since the stopping time then still is totally inaccessible for the financial
27
market.
9Note that in the proof we both assume that Vt = v when calculating
P (s) and that V lt = v when calculating P
m(s), but this is as it should to be
since we prove the result “ceteris paribus”.
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Table I: Effect of delayed information The table shows how the default
barrier V mB and the price of the bankruptcy lottery pi(V
m
B ) varies for different
lengths of the information lag m. The parameter values are α = 0.3, r =
0.08, µ = 0.045, σ = 0.3, θ = 0.3, C = 13, and D = 90.
m V mB VB pi(V
m
B )
0.0 65.0000 65.0000 0.0000
0.2 65.0000 65.0000 0.0000
0.5 65.0289 65.0000 0.0036
1.0 65.6098 65.0000 0.1291
1.5 67.0580 65.0000 0.5834
2.0 69.2680 65.0000 1.4737
2.5 72.1945 65.0000 2.8798
3.0 75.8860 65.0000 4.9026
3.5 80.4840 65.0000 7.6939
4.0 86.2511 65.0000 11.4961
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Table II: Effect of volatility under delayed information The table
shows how the default barrier V mB and the price of the bankruptcy lottery
pi(V mB ) varies for different levels of the volatility σ. The parameter values
are α = 0.3, r = 0.08, µ = 0.045, m = 0.2, θ = 0.3, and C = 13. D is
approximately equal to the market value of corporate debt when δt = 3.5.
σ D V mB VB pi(V
m
B )
0.15 92 93.2899 93.2899 0.0000
0.25 99 73.6273 73.6273 0.0000
0.50 81 39.9644 39.9643 0.0000
0.75 62 23.3913 23.3901 0.0001
1.00 48 14.9151 14.9079 0.0009
2.50 16 3.0370 2.8094 0.0836
5.00 6 1.2562 0.7214 0.3902
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Figure 1: Observable EBIT process The figure shows the EBIT process
observable at time t for agents with different information delays.
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Figure 2: Credit spreads classical case The figure shows the credit
spreads for zero-coupon bonds with up to three years to maturity.
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Figure 3: Effect of asymmetric information on credit spreads The
figure shows credit spreads for zero-coupon bonds with up to three years to
maturity. The upper graph represents the case where the management has
a delay m and the bond holders a delay l. The lower graph represents the
complete information case.
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Figure 4: CDS spreads The figure shows the CDS spreads for different
times to maturity. The top graph represents the case with delayed and
asymmetric information.
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Figure 5: Effect of volatility on overnight credit spreads The figure
shows the overnight credit spreads for different values of the underlying
volatility σ. Other parameter values are: δt−l = 3.5, µ = 0.045, r = 0.08,
θ = 0.3, α = 0.3, m = 0.1, and l = 0.25.
38
85.0 87.5 90.0 92.5 95.0 97.5 100.0 102.5 105.0 107.5 110.0 112.5 115.0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
Spread
Vtl
Figure 6: Effect of assessed asset values on overnight credit spreads
The figure shows the overnight credit spreads for different values of the
assessed asset value V lt . Other parameter values are: µ = 0.045, r = 0.08,
σ = 0.3, θ = 0.3, α = 0.3, m = 0.1, and l = 0.25.
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